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Abstract
A flexible multivariate model of a time-varying joint distribution of asset re-
turns is developed which allows for regime switching and a joint skew-normal
distribution. A suite of tests for linear and nonlinear financial market conta-
gion is developed within the framework. The model is illustrated through an
application to contagion between US and European equity markets during the
Global Financial Crisis. The results show that correlation contagion dominates
coskewness contagion, but that coskewness contagion is significant for Greece. A
flight to safety to the US is also evident in the significance of breaks in the skew-
ness parameter in the crisis regime. Comparison to the Asian crisis shows that
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a flexible multivariate econometric model of a time-varying joint
distribution of asset returns. The useful features of the model are that it allows for
regime switching and for the set of assets to follow a joint skew-normal distribution.
The model is referred to as a regime switching skew-normal (RSSN) model and is an
extension of Hamilton (1989), as the multivariate skew normal distribution assumption
allows for non-normality, better reflecting the characteristics of high frequency financial
market data. Although the model is suitable for a variety of applications, it is partic-
ularly suited to the study of financial market contagion. A feature of the framework
is that it is able to estimate the emergence of new linear and non-linear comovements
between asset returns that are likely to emerge during a switch to a crisis regime. Since
the proposed RSSN model is a high dimensional latent variable model, estimation and
inference using the classical approach is diffi cult. Instead, the model is estimated us-
ing Bayesian methods, particularly Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms.
The model is illustrated through an application to US and European equity markets
during the Global Financial Crisis. The majority of papers examining financial market
contagion during the recent crisis focus on sovereign debt markets, making the paper
complementary to this literature (also see Bekaert et al., 2014).
Table 1 motivates the use of the skew normal-distribution by depicting summary
statistics including higher order moments and comoments of the daily equity returns for
the US and selected European countries over two periods.1 The periods are from 2005
to mid 2007 and from March 2008 to the end of 2014, and are loosely labeled the Great
Moderation and the Global Financial Crisis respectively.2 The table shows evidence
of non-normality in the asset returns of each country in both periods. However, the
statistics are very different. In the crisis period, mean returns are lower and negative
for all countries compared to those for the Great Moderation. The magnitudes of the
minimum, maximum and standard deviation of returns are also larger. Of note are
1This paper takes a parametric approach and uses the skew normal-distribution to model asset
returns. An alternative is to consider a nonparametric approach, such as using the Dirichlet process
mixture model (see for examples, Escobar, 1994; Escobar and West, 1995; Chan et al., 2017). The
parametric approach is more convenient for our purpose since higher order moments and comoments
of the skew normal-distribution are simple functions of the parameters. By contrast, they are more
diffi cult to define under the Dirichlet process mixture model.
2Note that the dates are indicative and arbitrarily chosen, loosely corresponding to events signaling
the end of the Great Moderation period and the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis period as
discussed in Section 5.2.
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Table 1:
Preliminary statistics for the equity returns of selected markets in Europe and the US
in the Great Moderation and the Global Financial Crisis periods.
France Germany Greece Italy US
Great Moderation: January 4, 2005 to July 25, 2007
Mean 0.065 0.107 0.090 0.043 0.038
Minimum -4.037 -4.931 -5.262 -3.364 -3.349
Maximum 3.698 4.492 5.015 3.069 2.069
Std. dev. 0.925 1.057 1.101 0.875 0.634
Skewness -0.234 -0.564 -0.371 -0.279 -0.333
Correlation 0.413 0.346 0.178 0.384
Coskewness -0.113 -0.157 -0.151 -0.151
Global Financial Crisis: March 3, 2008 to November 28, 2014
Mean -0.084 -0.092 -0.146 -0.118 -0.066
Minimum -11.737 -11.326 -11.366 -10.864 -8.201
Maximum 12.143 11.887 12.084 12.381 10.508
Std. dev. 2.718 2.760 2.673 2.793 2.193
Skewness 0.250 0.087 -0.193 0.169 0.165
Correlation 0.533 0.520 0.350 0.485
Coskewness -0.098 -0.116 -0.189 -0.132
Notes: The comoment statistics of correlation and coskewness are
calculated for each country with the US. The coskewness
statistic is assumed to be symmetric.
the statistics of market comovement for the European returns with those of the US,
which show that not only does correlation with the US rise in the Global Financial
Crisis period for all European countries, but coskewness becomes more positive. It is
natural to expect a significant increase in cross market correlation, or contagion, as
is the definition adopted in Forbes and Rigobon (2002).3 This is commonly referred
to as shift-contagion, emphasizing the change component. However, the change in the
coskewness statistics illustrate that the linear correlation coeffi cient may not reflect all
changes in market dependence.
Our definition of contagion extends the concept to include changes in higher order
comoments of returns. The RSSN model is able to specifically capture changes in the
joint distribution of equity returns occurring through correlation contagion, as well as
through coskewness contagion, as is alluded to by the descriptive statistics.4 Fry et
3See King and Wadhwani (1990) for the first application of a correlation based approach to crises
in financial markets.
4The model could easily be adapted to handle even higher order comoments such as cokurtosis (see
Fry-McKibbin and Hsiao, 2018).
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al., (2010) examine bivariate coskewness statistics for contagion analogous to those of
the Forbes and Rigobon correlation statistic. This work is extended in this paper to a
multivariate setting and to a joint testing framework. An additional feature is that the
model also captures structural breaks in the moments of the asset returns of the mean,
variance and skewness. Disentangling changes in the asset returns distribution due to
comoment or to moment changes has implications in determining the appropriate focus
of portfolio allocation decisions and international shock mitigation policies, in being
domestically oriented, internationally oriented or both.5
In addition to the empirical stylized facts relating to the changing nature of higher
order comoments during crisis periods, there is a rich theoretical literature on the
role of higher order comoments linking asset returns. Often the capital asset pricing
model forms the basis of the framework. This includes Harvey and Siddique (2000)
where asset pricing models featuring skewness induce coskewness into expected returns.
Smith (2007) and Guidolin and Timmerman (2008) show that higher order comoments
that are time varying are important for pricing asset returns, while Potì and Wang
(2010) show that coskewness risk is a partial explanation for differences in returns
on portfolios. Lambert and Hübner (2013) focus on the US market, and find that
differences in coskewness across regimes can explain the equity home bias, and that
comoment risk is significantly priced by the US market. Such adjustments can occur
as risk averse agents alter their skewness and coskewness preferences, as well as their
portfolio allocation depending on the regime. Guidolin and Timmerman (2008) and Fry
et al., (2010) show that as risk aversion increases, investors prefer positive skewness and
positive coskewness. The latter authors provide an explicit expression for risk prices
and quantities in terms of higher order comoments. This is consistent with changes
in the joint distribution of asset returns such as through contagion and structural
breaks. Several papers suggest a role for investor behavior in crisis periods such as
herd behavior, wake up calls, sudden stops, wealth effects, portfolio rebalancing, credit
contractions, self fulfilling expectations and information asymmetry. See the classic
articles by Krugman (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999), Calvo and Mendoza
(2000), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Loisel and Martin (2001) and Yuan (2005). These
models are not mutually exclusive to those based on higher order comoments, and all
are consistent with the increasing risk aversion of investors inherent in crisis periods.
5Fry-McKibbin et al., (2014) show that mispricing of asset returns can undermine hedging strategies
if risk reflected in higher order moments is ignored during crisis episodes.
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There is some evidence of a flight to safety, liquidity or quality during crisis periods.
Baur and Lucey (2009), Baele et al., (2013) and Adrian et al., (2015) examine flights
between stocks and bonds. During the European sovereign debt crisis, Allegret et
al., (2017) find that the US banking sector may have benefitted, while Ehrmann and
Fratscher (2017) find evidence of a flight to quality in Europe in bond markets. We
examine the concept of flight to safety in equity markets across countries in terms of
the moments and comoments across the regimes. As Adrian et al., (2015) show, there
are possibly non-linearities in the flight to safety relationship, in their case between
stocks and bonds.
An appealing feature of the RSSN model is that the switching between regimes is
endogenous. Crisis duration is usually the choice of the researcher and exogenously
imposed on the model (see Gravelle et al., 2006 for an exception). Figure 1 illustrates
the potential arbitrariness of the crisis dating choice and how this could lead to mal-
leable conclusions. The figure shows rolling bivariate test statistics of contagion based
on changes in correlation between the US and each of the European equity returns
shown in Table 1. A value of the test statistic above the critical value line is evidence
of contagion in the previous 30 days compared to the non-crisis period. The figure
shows that contagion is not significant on every crisis day, particularly for Greece, and
also highlights that the test results depend on the crisis dating. The RSSN model
circumvents these problems as it embeds the flexibility to switch between crisis and
non-crisis days. Further, crisis days are not necessarily consecutive in time.
Dungey et al., (2015) specify an alternative approach to endogenously model crisis
periods using smooth transition functions in conjunction with a GARCH model, while
others such as Contessi et al., (2014) and Guidolin and Tam (2013) use break point
tests. Ang and Bekaert (2002), Billio and Caporin (2005), Gravelle et al., (2006),
Pelletier (2006), Kim et al., (2008), Guo et al., (2011) and Kasch and Caporin (2013)
use regime switching models to test for market dependence, but most of these assume
a normally distributed error term. Few papers specify a regime switching model with
higher order moments. Harvey and Siddique (2000), Ang and Timmermann (2011)
and Grothe et al., (2014) are examples, but they do not focus on contagion. However,
the label of contagion adopted in this paper could equally apply.
The empirical results show that several patterns emerge. The transition to a crisis
period is volatile in terms of switching between the non-crisis and crisis regimes. Eq-
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Figure 1: Bivariate test statistics of contagion based on changes in correlation between
the equity returns of selected markets in Europe and the US. The statistics are calcu-
lated with respect to a fixed non-crisis period from January 5, 2005 to July 25, 2007.
The crisis period is a 30 day rolling window from July 26, 2008 to August 31, 2009.
The horizontal line represents the χ21 critical value of 3.84. The data is prefiltered using
a VAR(5).
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collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008. When in a crisis regime, contagion through
traditional correlation dominates coskewness contagion, with correlation contagion be-
ing significant for all of the asset returns of the European countries in the sample when
paired with the US. Coskewness contagion is significant only for the Greece-US pair,
confirming the use of the correlation coeffi cient as a first measure of contagion. In com-
parison with the Asian Financial Crisis between Hong Kong and several Asian countries
similar qualitative results emerge. There is volatility in the regime while transitioning
from the non-crisis to the crisis period. Correlation based contagion is significant for
all countries with Hong Kong. Coskewness contagion is significant for the one case of
the Malaysia-Hong Kong pair. Greece and Malaysia have abrupt changes to policies
affecting international investors in common, with Greece defaulting on their sovereign
debt, and Malaysia responding to the crisis through the imposition of capital controls.
The results also validate the importance of considering contagion and structural breaks
in a multivariate setting as evident by their joint significance.
In both crises there is a clear flight to safety in the moment break tests. The US in
the Global Financial Crisis and Japan in the Asian Financial Crisis are the only asset
markets showing breaks in all three moments of the mean, variance and skewness. The
skewness coeffi cient in particular is the most relevant for risk averse investors. In both
models, the skewness coeffi cients of all markets become more positive, as is consistent
with the needs of risk averse investors. The exception is for skewness in the US which
becomes more negative, indicating investors lower risk aversion in the US market, and
greater risk appetite for US assets relative to those in Europe. This is despite the US
being a source of shocks during the crisis period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the multivariate
RSSN model of asset returns. Section 3 documents the Bayesian estimation approach
including the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling scheme. Section 4 out-
lines the hypotheses and testing methods for the contagion and structural break tests.
Section 5 presents the empirical analysis for the Global Financial Crisis including a
comparison to the Asian Financial Crisis. Section 6 concludes.
2 An RSSN Model of Asset Returns
An RSSN model is specified in this section to provide a general framework to analyze
linear and non-linear contagion between asset markets and structural breaks in the
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moments of asset markets across regimes. Section 2.1 sets out the details of the multi-
variate skew-normal distribution that underlies the regime switching model described
in Section 2.2. The skew-normal assumption combined with the regime switching al-
lows the correlation and coskewness contagion parameters in a crisis regime to change.
In comparison to other models of contagion, there is also an allowance for structural
breaks in asset moments that have no associated transmission to other asset markets
such as in the mean, variance and skewness.
2.1 Skew-normal Distribution
The skew-normal distribution as developed by Sahu et al., (2003) has the following
latent variable representation
yt = µ+ ΩZt + εt, (1)
εt
iid∼ N (0,Σ) , (2)
Zt
iid∼ N (c1m, Im) 1 (Zjt > c, j = 1, . . . ,m) , (3)
where yt = (y1t, . . . , ymt)
′ is an m-dimensional random vector with t = 1, . . . , T , µ
is an m × 1 vector of constants, Ω is an m × m skewness coskewness matrix, Zt =
(Z1t, . . . , Zmt)
′ is an m-dimensional random vector, εt is an m × 1 innovation vector,
Σ is an m ×m variance covariance matrix, 1m is an m × 1 column of ones, Im is the
identity matrix, and 1(·) is a (scalar) indicator function which takes a value of 1 if all
Zjt are greater than c and 0 otherwise.6
The inclusion of the vector of latent variables Zt allows for skewness in the distrib-
ution which enriches the dependence between the components of yt. Sahu et al., (2003)
assume that Ω is a diagonal skewness-coskewness matrix. However, this assumption is
restrictive in the context of modeling comovements since it does not allow for coskew-
ness between the components of yt. Coskewness for yt is introduced by relaxing the
assumption that Ω is diagonal. Specifically, Ω = (ωij) is a full m×m coskewness ma-
trix with i, j = 1, . . . ,m. The off-diagonal elements of Ω are the coskewness parameters
which control asymmetric dependence between the components of yt.7
6The constant term c is set to be −
√
2/π, so that the latent variables Zt do not affect the uncon-
ditional expectation of yt.
7An alternative identification strategy is to assume that Ω is triangular. Here, we assume that Ω is
symmetric. Since the two assumptions leave the same number of free parameters in Ω, both solutions
are essentially the same. The latter restriction is chosen as it gives an easier interpretation of the
parameters.
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The probability density function of yt marginally of Zt is
fSN (yt;µ,Σ,Ω) =
2m
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fN (yt) is the density function of the standard multivariate normal distribution with
mean 0 and identity covariance matrix Im evaluated at yt. If Ω = 0, then the skew-
normal distribution in equations (1) to (3) reduces to the usual multivariate normal
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Figure 2 plots the contours of the bivariate skew-normal density in equation (4) with
zero mean (µ = 0), identity scale matrix (Σ=I2) and various patterns of asymmetric
dependence (Ω = (ωij), i, j = 1, 2). The center panel of Figure 2 illustrates the case of
a symmetric bivariate normal distribution with ω11 = ω22 = ω12 = ω21 = 0. The off-
centre panels of the figure emphasize the skewness and heavy tails generated compared
to the bivariate distribution in the centre panel as skewness and coskewness of the
distribution interact as the parameters ωij change. These plots reflect the relationships
in high frequency financial market data across the varying regimes as illustrated in
Table 1.
2.2 Regime Switching with the Skew-normal Distribution
The RSSN model of asset returns extends the regime switching model of Hamilton
(1989) by assuming that under each regime, yt has a multivariate skew-normal distri-
bution. This extension is useful as it not only captures the stylized behavior of asset
returns including asymmetry, heavy tails, heteroskedasticity, time-varying linear and
non-linear comoments among the asset markets, but also controls parameters which
are allowed to differ across the states.
Consider the multivariate skew-normal distribution of a set of asset returns yt of
Section 2.1, but allow for the model parameters to be state dependent as follows
yt = µst + ΩstZt + εt, (7)
εt
iid∼ N (0,Σst) , (8)
Zt
iid∼ N (c1m, Im) 1 (Zjt > c, j = 1, . . . ,m) . (9)
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Figure 2: Contour plots of the bivariate skew-normal density. The plots are of equa-
tion (4) with zero mean (µ = 0), identity scale matrix (Σ = I2) and differing values
of coskewness ωij. The central panel corresponds to a symmetric bivariate normal
distribution with ω11 = ω22 = ω12 = ω21 = 0.
The regime st at time t is a binary variable that takes the values of 0 or 1, or
st ∈ {0, 1}. There are two sets of regime-dependent parameters, (µ0,Ω0,Σ0) and
(µ1,Ω1,Σ1). To emphasize the regime, the set of parameters (µl,Ωl,Σl) is sometimes
written as (µst=l,Ωst=l,Σst=l) for l = 0, 1.
The flexibility of the RSSN model allows the parameters including the means, µst,
coskewness, Ωst , and the error cross-covariances, Σst in equations (7) to (9) to change
in regime st = 1 compared to regime st = 0. Changes in the parameters controlling
market linkages of correlation and coskewness during the second regime are contagion.
Changes in the moment parameters of the mean, variance and skewness in the second
regime are structural breaks.
For estimation purposes, equations (7) to (9) are rewritten as
yt = Xtβst + εt, (10)
εt
iid∼ N (0,Σst) , (11)
where











The dimensions of µst, ωst and βst are m, k and (m+ k) respectively with k = m
2.
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To complete the model, the process governing the underlying state of the regime,
st, needs to be specified. Assume the standard Markov transition
Pr (st = 1|st−1 = i) = pit, (12)
for i = 0 and 1, where the probabilities pit are fixed constants that vary with time.
The parameters of the RSSN model are
Θ = (β0, β1,Σ0,Σ1) . (13)
For later reference, stack y = (y′1, . . . , y
′
T )
′, Z = (Z ′1, . . . , Z
′
T )
′ and s = (s1, . . . , sT )
′.
For convenience, let µi,l denote the i-th element of µl, l = 0, 1, and similarly define Σij,l
and Ωij,l.






, st = 0, 1. (14)
For convenience, ρij,st is sometimes labeled as ρij,l with l = 0, 1.
3 Bayesian Estimation of the RSSN Model
A Bayesian approach is used to estimate the model parameters.8 MCMC methods
are used to obtain draws from the posterior distribution required for the analysis as
documented in this Section.
Likelihood Function and Priors The complete-data likelihood function of the
RSSN model in equations (10) to (11) is given by






















where Θ = (β0, β1,Σ0,Σ1) and st ∈ {0, 1}.






Σst ∼ IW (τΣ, SΣ) , (17)
Pr (st = 1|st−1 = i) = pit, Pr (st = 0|st−1 = i) = 1− pit, (18)
8The model was estimated using MATLAB. The code is available at
http://joshuachan.org/code.html.
10
where IW (τΣ, SΣ) denotes the inverse-Wishart distribution with degree of freedom τΣ




, and the prior





, where k = m2.
Posterior Analysis The Gibbs sampler is used for estimating the RSSN model.
It follows from Bayes rule that the joint posterior distribution is proportional to the
product of the complete-data likelihood function and the joint prior density, as follows
π (Θ, Z,s|y) ∝ f (y|Z,Θ,s) f (Z) f (s|Θ) π (Θ) , (19)
where f (Z) and f (s|Θ) are given in equations (9) and (18) respectively. Note that the
notation π denotes the prior and posterior density functions. The likelihood function
f (y|Z,Θ,s) is given in equation (15). By assuming prior independence between β and
Σ, the joint prior density is given by
π (Θ) = π(β0)π(β1)π(Σ0)π(Σ1). (20)
Posterior draws from the joint posterior distribution can be obtained via the fol-
lowing Gibbs sampler:























with l = 0, 1. Set counter loop = 1, ...n.

















• Step 4: Generate Σ(loop)l from π
(
Σl|y, Z(loop−1), β(loop)l , s(loop)
)
.





• Step 6: Set loop = loop+ 1 and go to Step 2.
The number of iterations set for Steps 2 to 5 is n. The first n0 of these are dis-
carded as burn-in draws, and the remaining n1 are retained to compute the parameter
estimates, where n = n0 + n1. The full conditional distributions are given below, and
their derivations are presented in Appendix A.
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The posterior distribution for βl, l = 0, 1, conditional on y, Z,Σ0,Σ1 and s is a
q-variate normal distribution with q = m+ k given by
















and β̂l = Dβl
[










The posterior distribution for Σl, l = 0, 1, conditional on y, Z, β0, β1 and s has an
inverse-Wishart distribution
(Σl|y, Z, βl, s) ∼ IW (τΣl , SΣl) , (22)
where τΣl = τΣ +
T∑
t=1










Next, the latent variables Z1, . . . , ZT are conditionally independent given y, β0, β1,Σ0,Σ1


























sible sampling approach to obtain the draws from the above truncated multivariate
normal distribution is to draw Zt component by component, where each component
follows a truncated univariate normal distribution where all other components are given
(Geweke, 1991 and Robert, 1995). Draws from the truncated univariate normal dis-
tribution are generated by using the inverse transform method (Kroese et al., 2011,
p.45).
To generate the regime variable st, a multi-move Gibbs sampling method is used. In
particular, the success probabilities are computed using standard filtering and smooth-
ing algorithms for hidden Markov models, such as the algorithms described in Chib
(1996) and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2006).
4 Testing for Contagion and Structural Breaks
This section sets out the procedure for testing for contagion and structural breaks. For
reference, the restrictions on the RSSNmodel parameters for the tests for contagion and
structural breaks and the method used to evaluate each hypothesis are summarized in
Table 2. Details describing the methods used to evaluate the hypotheses are contained
in Section 4.1, while Sections 4.2 to 4.4 outline the hypothesis tests.
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Table 2:
Summary of the restrictions on the model parameters and the hypothesis evaluation
methods for the tests for contagion and structural breaks.
Method Restrictions
Tests (DR) market i ∀i
Contagion tests (i 6= j)
Correlation p ρij,0 < ρij,1 Υ0 < Υ1
Coskewness BF ωij,0 = ωij,1 Ω0 = Ω1
Corr. BF ρij,0 = ρij,1, ωij,0 = ωij,1 Υ0 = Υ1,Ω0 = Ω1
&coskew.
Structural break tests (i)
Mean p µi,0 > µi,1 µ0 > µ1
Variance p Σii,0 < Σii,1 Σ0 < Σ1
Skewness BF ωii,0 = ωii,1 ω0 = ω1
Mean,var. BF µi,0 = µi,1,Σii,0 = Σii,1, ωii,0 = ωii,1 µ0 = µ1,Σ0 = Σ1, ω0 = ω1
&skew.
Joint contagion (i 6= j) and structural break tests (i)
All BF µi,0 = µi,1,Σii,0 = Σii,1, ωii,0 = ωii,1 µ0 = µ1,Σ0 = Σ1, ω0 = ω1,
& ρij,0 = ρij,1, ωij,0 = ωij,1 Υ0 = Υ1,Ω0 = Ω1
Notes: The tests are for a change in each parameter in the crisis period st = 1 compared to
a non-crisis period st = 0. The method of hypothesis evaluation (DR) for each test is indicated
in the table. p denotes that a decision is probability based. BF denotes that a decision is based on
the log of the Bayes factor using the model selection evidence categories in Table 3.
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The RSSN model is the unrestricted model (Mu) with two sets of regime-specific
parameters. These are the regime-specific mean vectors µ0 and µ1 (each of dimension
m × 1), covariance matrices Σ0 and Σ1 (each of dimension m × m) and coskewness
matrices Ω0 and Ω1 (each of dimension m × m). Recall that µi,l denotes the i-th
element of µl, and similarly, for Σij,l and Ωij,l. Notably, the correlation coeffi cient
ρij,l is estimated by the covariance (Σij,l) divided by the product of the square root of
the variances Σii,l and Σjj,l. For later reference Υl denotes the sum of the individual





ρij,l used in the joint tests for correlation contagion.
4.1 Hypothesis Test Evaluation Methods
Two decision rules (DR) are available for evaluating the hypotheses depending upon
the form that the hypothesis for contagion or structural breaks takes.
Hypotheses with inequality restrictions If the hypothesis contains an inequality
restriction then the probability of contagion or a structural break is simply calculated
using the proportion that the hypothesis is true in the MCMC draws and is denoted
by p.
Hypotheses with equality restrictions If the tests involve equality restrictions,
Bayesian model comparison methods using the natural logarithm of the Bayes factor
are conducted, and is denoted by BF . Bayesian model comparison provides a unified
approach for comparing non-nested models, and is an alternative to classical hypothesis
testing. Consider comparing models Mr and Mu. Evidence in favor of model Mr can





where p (y|Mr) and p (y|Mu) are the marginal likelihoods of the data under models
Mr and Mu respectively. Intuitively, the marginal likelihood p(y|Mr) is simply the
marginal distribution of y under model Mr evaluated using the data. If the data are
improbable under model Mr, the marginal likelihood will be small and vice versa.
Hence, the Bayes factor BFru, which is the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of the two
models shows which model better predicts the data. The marginal likelihood of the
data under model i can be defined as
p (y|Mi) =
f(y|Θ)π (Θ)
π (Θ|y) , i = r, u, (25)
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Table 3:
Model selection evidence categories for the log of the Bayes factor.
Value of ln (BFru) Evidence categories
(0,∞) Evidence in support of model Mr
(−1.15, 0) Very slight evidence in support of model Mu
(−2.30,−1.15) Slight evidence in support of model Mu
(−4.60,−2.30) Strong evidence in support of model Mu
(−∞,−4.60) Decisive evidence in support of model Mu
Notes: The log of the Bayes factor (ln (BFru) = ln (p (y|Mr))− ln (p (y|Mu))
is used for model selection following Jeffrey’s rule (Jeffreys, 1961).
where Θ is a parameter set in the model, f(y|Θ) is a likelihood and π (Θ|y) is a
posterior density. The prior density can easily be evaluated, whereas the evaluation
of the likelihood and the posterior density requires Monte Carlo simulation methods.
Chib’s method is used to compute the marginal likelihoods when required (Chib, 1995;
Chib and Jeliazkov, 2001).
The posterior odds ratio for model Mr against model Mu is related to their Bayes





where π (Mr) and π (Mu) are the prior probabilities of models Mr and Mu. Clearly, if
both models have an equally likely prior, then the Bayes factor is also the posterior
odds ratio of the two models. If the two models under comparison are nested, then
the Bayes factor can be calculated using the Savage-Dickey density ratio which is often
much simpler to compute (Verdinelli and Wasserman, 1995). Since hypothesis testing
can be framed as comparing nested models, the density ratio can be used to compute
the relevant Bayes factor. The details of the Savage-Dickey density ratio are contained
in Appendix B.9
Model Mr is chosen over model Mu if the Bayes factor in favor of Mr (BFru) is
suffi ciently large. The choice of threshold on which this decision is made is based on
the scale of evidence for model selection as proposed by Jeffreys (1961), shown in Table
3.
9This approach can only be utilized when the two models are nested, so that there exists at least
one point in the parameter space of the unrestricted model where its likelihood is equivalent to that
of the restricted model.
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4.2 Contagion
The first type of test for contagion between markets is based on an increase in the
correlation coeffi cient in st = 1 compared to st = 0 (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). That
is,
ρij,st=1 > ρij,st=0, i 6= j. (27)
The prior is that the correlation parameters are expected to rise as markets move
together more closely during a crisis. The relevant form of the correlation change
test between asset markets i and j is ρij,1 − ρij,0 > 0. The probability of correlation
contagion between markets i and j is
Pr(ρij,1 − ρij,0 > 0|y,Mu), (28)
which can be calculated from the MCMC draws.
The test for joint correlation contagion between them−1 pairs of asset returns with
market j is also considered. The relevant restriction for testing for joint correlation






ρij,l. As before, the joint probability of correlation contagion across the
m− 1 markets with market j can be calculated from the MCMC draws.
The coskewness contagion test is given by
ωij,st=0 6= ωij,st=1 , i 6= j. (29)
The test is for a change in the asymmetric dependence of returns i and j in regime
st = 0 compared with regime st = 1. The restricted model for the coskewness change
test is ωij,0 = ωij,1, i 6= j. This hypothesis is compatible with the bivariate coskewness
statistics for contagion of Fry et al., (2010). The joint test for contagion through
shifts in coskewness across all m asset markets is an extension of that paper with the





ωij,0 = ωij,1, alternatively expressed as ω0 = ω1. The
relevant Bayes factors are computed using the marginal likelihoods.
4.3 Structural Breaks
The hypothesis for a structural break in the mean for asset market i during st = 1
compared to st = 0 is based on a reduction in the mean as in financial crisis periods it
is expected that returns are lower. The probability for market i is
Pr(µi,1 − µi,0 < 0|y,Mu) (30)
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and is calculated from the MCMC draws.
A joint version of a test for a structural break in the mean across allm asset markets
is also considered. While the test for a structural break in an individual market uses
the elements specific to market i (µi,0 and µi,1), the joint test for a mean break for all
m markets utilizes the whole mean vectors µ1 and µ0 in the computation. The relevant




µi,0 − µi,1 ≥ 0|y,Mu), (31)
which is calculated from the MCMC draws.
The second type of test for a structural break is a for a change in the variance of
the returns of market i in the crisis period compared with the non-crisis period,
Σii,st=1 6= Σii,st=0.
This test for a structural break in the variance has the form Σii,1 − Σii,0 > 0 as in
the financial crisis regime it is expected that the variance of returns will increase. The
probability is
Pr(Σii,1 − Σii,0 > 0|y,Mu). (32)
This is calculated from the MCMC draws. The joint test for a structural break in the
variance for all m asset markets is based on the restriction
m∑
i=1
(Σii,1 > Σii,0) , and is
estimated by calculating the proportion of times Σ1 − Σ0 > 0 in the MCMC draws.
The last type of structural break captures a change in tail behavior, or the third
order moment of asset returns i in regime st = 1 compared to regime st = 0 and is
given by
ωii,st=0 6= ωii,st=1 . (33)
Yuan (2005) shows that borrowing constraints and information asymmetry can change
the distribution of returns especially during downturns. While it is clear that in a
crisis mean asset returns are expected to fall and volatility to rise, the direction of
skewness change is less obvious. Ingersoll (1987), Shleifer and Vishney (1997), Harvey
and Siddique (2000), Fry et al., (2010) and Conrad et al., (2013) suggest that skewness
should change positively, while Black (1972), Bekaert and Wu (2000), Das and Uppal
(2004) and Yuan (2005) suggest the opposite. Although our expectation is for positive
skewness in a crisis, we recognize that both cases are possible so remain agnostic to
the direction of change in the empirical work in Section 5.
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To examine the evidence for a structural break in the skewness for market i, across
regimes st = 0 and st = 1, consider the hypothesis that ωii,1 = ωii,0. This hypothesis
can be recast to compare the unrestricted model Mu and restricted Mr models where
ωii,1 = ωii,0 is imposed. InMu all regime-specific parameters are free to vary across the
two periods. Mr features no shift in the return skewness for the asset market i between
the two regimes. This implies that under the restricted model return skewness in the
two periods remains the same. Clearly, Mr is nested within Mu by setting ωii,1 = ωii,0.
The Bayes factor comparingMr toMu for the skewness structural break is computed
using the Savage-Dickey density ratio
BFru =
π (ωii,1 − ωii,0 = 0|y,Mu)
π (ωii,1 − ωii,0 = 0|Mu)
, (34)
where π (ωii,1 − ωii,0 = 0|y,Mu) and π (ωii,1 − ωii,0 = 0|Mu) are respectively the poste-
rior and prior densities of ωii,1−ωii,0 evaluated at point 0. Since the priors for ωii,0 and
ωii,1 are assumed to be normal, with mean zero and variance φω (equation (16)), the
denominator of equation (34) can be calculated, since the induced prior for ωii,1−ωii,0 is
normal with mean zero and variance 2φω. The numerator of this expression is estimated
by averaging the quantity π (ωii,1 − ωii,0 = 0|y, Z,Σ0,Σ1, s) in the MCMC draws.
The restricted model for the joint version of the test for the skewness break in all
m asset markets is ωii,0 = ωii,1, i = 1, . . . ,m, alternatively expressed as ω0 = ω1. The
Bayes factor is computed using the Savage-Dickey density ratio.
4.4 Joint Contagion and Structural Breaks
The flexibility of the RSSN model enables the testing of the joint contagion and struc-
tural breaks across all asset markets. The complete set of restrictions on the RSSN
model for each case are summarized in the last row of each panel of Table 1.
In all of the joint tests, the RSSN model is the unrestricted model, with the sets
of regime-specific parameters of µ0 and µ1, Σ0 and Σ1, and Ω0 and Ω1. The choice of
restricted model Mr for use in the calculation of the Bayes factor depends on which
parameters have been constrained. For example, the restricted model for a joint struc-
tural break test based on shifts in the mean, variance and skewness is constructed by
imposing the conditions µi,0 = µi,1, Σii,0 = Σii,1 and ωii,0 = ωii,1. In this case the Bayes


















µi,1 − µi,0 = 0,Σii,1 − Σii,0, ωii,1 − ωii,0 = 0|Mu
)
are the posterior and prior densities
for µi,1 − µi,0, Σii,1 − Σii,0 and ωii,1 − ωii,0 evaluated at point 0.
Equation (35) is slightly more diffi cult to evaluate. This is because although the
prior for µ is normal (equation (16)) and Σ0 is an inverse-Wishart density (equa-
tion (22)), π
(
µi,1 − µi,0 = 0,Σii,1 − Σii,0, ωii,1 − ωii,0 = 0|y,Mu
)
is not a known density.
Gaussian kernel estimates are used to approximate the two quantities
π
(





µi,1 − µi,0 = 0,Σii,1 − Σii,0, ωii,1 − ωii,0 = 0|Mu
)
. The details of the Geweke’s (2010)
Gaussian kernel method for evaluating the densities are contained in Appendix C.
5 Empirical Example
This section applies the RSSN model of contagion to the Great Moderation and Global
Financial Crisis periods.10 The data is outlined in Section 5.1. Details of the estima-
tion of the RSSN model are contained in Section 5.2 and the results of the contagion
and structural break tests are in Section 5.3. Sensitivity to the prior specification is
undertaken in Section 5.4. Finally, the application is compared to the model for the
Asian Financial Crisis in Section 5.5.
5.1 US and European Data
The data consists of US and European equity returns between January 4, 2005 to
November 28, 2014 (T = 2585).11 Daily percentage returns are computed as the
difference of the natural logarithms of the daily price indices, multiplied by 100. All
data series are denominated in US dollars. To account for time zone differences the US
series is lagged by one period in comparison to the European data, and as is standard
10We have compared the proposed RSSN model to four popular time-varying volatility models using
the marginal likelihood. The purpose of comparing the RSSN model to other models common in the
literature is to demonstrate that the RSSN model provides a reasonable fit to the data relative to
models which do not assume normality such as various GARCH models including the factor-GARCH,
factor-ARCH, diagonal-vector-GARCH (DVEC-GARCH) and diagonal-vector-ARCH (DVEC-ARCH)
models. The results confirmed the advantages of the RSSN model. In particular, the across-regime
(crisis and non-crisis) comparisons can legitimately be emphasized.
11The data source is Datastream. The mnemonics are: France - France CAC 40 price index (FR-
CAC40); Germany - MDAX Frankfurt price index (MDAXIDX); Greece - Athex Composite price
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Figure 3: Daily percentage equity returns of selected markets in Europe and the US.
Notes: The sample period is January 4, 2005 to November 28, 2014.
in the contagion literature the residuals of a VAR(5) are used as the data in the model.
Time series plots of the returns are contained in Figure 3.
5.2 RSSN Model Estimation
As is customary, the prior hyperparameters in equations (16) to (18) are assumed to
be known and are set to be β = 0, φµ = 0.01, φω = 1, τΣ = 20 + m + 1, SΣ =
(τΣ −m − 1) × Im with m = 5. The prior variances are chosen to be relatively small
so that the prior distributions are proper and relatively informative. Non-dogmatic
beliefs about the likelihoods of a change in regime from the Great Moderation to the
Global Financial Crisis occurring are incorporated formally via the prior probabilities
pit = Pr(st = 1|st−1 = i) for i = 0 and 1. To facilitate prior elicitation the simplifying
assumption is that
Pr (st = 1|st−1 = 0) = Pr (st = 1|st−1 = 1) = pt.
Specification of the prior makes it easy to incorporate information about the timing
of a regime change. Specifically, the initial value for the probability of being in regime
0 is set to Pr (st = 0) = 0.99 during the period from January 5, 2005 to July 25, 2007.
Mid 2007 is when vulnerabilities in the subprime mortgage markets first arose with
the Fed’s first policy response to the crisis in August with the provision of liquidity to
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Figure 4: Probability of being in the Global Financial Crisis regime. Notes: The sample
period is January 4, 2005 to November 28, 2014.
of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2007). The probability of being in
regime 1 is set to Pr (st = 1) = 0.99 during the period between March 3, 2008 and
November 27, 2014. March 2008 coincides with the bail out of Bear Stearns. The
probability of being in regime 0 decreases linearly from 0.99 on July 26, 2007 to 0.01






per day. For instance, the







there are 157 days between July 25, 2007 and March 3, 2008. Robustness to the choice
of prior is explored in Section 5.4.
For estimation purposes, the coskewness matrix Ω in equation (1) is restricted to
be a symmetric matrix, which means the dimension of ω reduces from k = m2 to
k = m(m + 1)/2. Furthermore, the constant term c in equation (3) is set to −
√
2/π
so that E (Zt) = 0 and V (Zt) = (π − 2) /π, and the inclusion of the latent variables
Zt does not affect the (unconditional) expectation of yt. In the original specification of
Sahu et al., (2003), c is set to be zero.
The Gibbs-sampling described in Appendix A is applied to the RSSN model. The
first 20, 000 draws are discarded in order to allow the Markov Chain to converge to a
stationary distribution. To reduce sample autocorrelation and to avoid biased Monte
Carlo standard errors, every 10 draws for the next 200, 000 iterations are recorded for a
total of 20, 000 draws which are used to calculate the posterior summaries. The criteria
for choosing independent draws is based on the ineffi ciency factors of the switching
parameters with the details shown in Appendix D. The MCMC algorithm is well
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behaved for the RSSNmodel with Table 8 in the Appendix showing that the ineffi ciency
factors are low for all switching parameters.
Figure 4 presents the probability that the model is in a particular regime over the
sample period. Inspection of the figure shows that equity markets briefly attempted
to transition to a new regime in mid January 2006, perhaps reflecting the emerging
pressures in the subprime market. However, the regime change becomes increasingly
evident in January of 2007, and consistently so by the February of 2008. The transition
between the regimes is volatile as the regime switches between the alternatives, even
before the key crisis trigger of the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 before finally
settling into the Global Financial Crisis regime.
Table 3 presents the posterior means of the regime-switching parameters when
innovations are fitted to the RSSN model of contagion. The first panel of the table
presents the results for regime st = 0, while the second panel presents the results for
regime st = 1. The parameters for correlation and coskewness all appear to change
across the regimes. The correlation of the pairs of markets is higher when st = 1
than when st = 0 for all pairs of markets. For coskewness two patterns emerge.
First, coskewness between almost all pairs of markets becomes less negative in the
Global Financial Crisis period compared to the Great Moderation regime, reflecting
the preference of risk averse investors for positive coskewness in a crisis period (Guidolin
and Timmerman, 2008 and Fry et al., 2010). The anomaly is for the value of coskewness
for the Greece-Italy pair which falls from −0.383 to −0.472. This combination is the
only pair to exhibit an increase in negative coskewness across the regimes.
Second, the coskewness statistics of the US returns with all of the European returns
change the most, with a switch from negative values ranging between −0.187 for the
Germany-US pair to −0.156 for the Italy-US pair when st = 0, to mainly positive
values of 0.018 for France-US, 0.105 for Italy-US, and 0.898 for Greece-US which is
the largest coeffi cient. The exception is for the Germany-US pair when st = 1 which
remains negative at -0.009, reflecting that investors are less risk averse in the German
market relative to the US than they are in the other European markets.
In terms of the moments, mean returns are positive for all markets in the Great
Moderation, while in the Global Financial Crisis they are negative for France, Greece
and Italy, but positive for the larger economies of Germany and the US. The variances
of equity returns for the European markets are higher by a factor of around 10 in
the Global Financial Crisis regime. The variance of the US returns increase as well
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Table 4:
Posterior means of the switching parameters.
Parameters Markets France Germany Greece Italy US
Great Moderation regime (st = 0)
Covariance (Σij,0) Germany 0.299
Greece 0.150 0.193
Italy 0.288 0.246 0.148
US 0.109 0.067 -0.013 0.089
Correlation (ρij,0) Germany 0.681
Greece 0.319 0.380
Italy 0.743 0.580 0.329
US 0.280 0.157 -0.032 0.236
Coskewness (ωij,0) Germany -0.653
Greece -0.423 -0.569
Italy -0.536 -0.593 -0.383
US -0.168 -0.187 -0.158 -0.156
Mean (µi=0) 0.044 0.079 0.066 0.025 0.031
Variance (Σii,0) 0.399 0.469 0.525 0.368 0.367
Skewness (ωii,0) -0.586 -0.761 -0.880 -0.488 -0.072
Global Financial Crisis regime (st = 1)
Covariance (Σij,1) Germany 3.257
Greece 2.850 2.799
Italy 3.611 3.366 3.037
US 1.530 1.468 1.515 1.611
Correlation (ρij,1) Germany 0.929
Greece 0.660 0.656
Italy 0.938 0.886 0.649
US 0.824 0.800 0.672 0.800
Coskewness (ωij,1) Germany -0.016
Greece -0.403 -0.398
Italy 0.036 -0.047 -0.472
US 0.018 -0.009 0.898 0.105
Mean (µi=1) -0.017 0.020 -0.074 -0.037 0.018
Variance (Σii,1) 3.551 3.463 5.253 4.172 0.971
Skewness (ωii,1) 0.061 -0.230 -0.655 -0.253 -1.018
Notes: posterior means of the covariance, correlation, coskewness, mean, variance
and skewness in the Great Moderation and Global Financial Crisis regimes for the equity
returns of selected markets in Europe and the US. The sample period is January 4, 2005
to November 27, 2014.
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but by a smaller magnitude. Interestingly, the skewness parameters of the equity
returns of Europe are all negative in regime st = 0 but become smaller in magnitude
as skewness reduces. Skewness falls from −0.761 to −0.230 for Germany, −0.880 to
−0.655 for Greece, and −0.488 to −0.253 for Italy. The direction of change is the same
for France although skewness for France changes sign (−0.586 to 0.061). Skewness in
the US becomes more negative in the Global Financial Crisis, changing from −0.072
to −1.018 as investors see the US as relatively safe compared to Europe.
5.3 Contagion and Breaks During the Global Financial Crisis
Table 5 presents the empirical results for the tests for contagion and structural breaks
that are summarized in Table 2 between the US equity returns and the selected equity
returns of the European countries. The table consists of three panels: the first examines
the evidence of contagion between the US and Europe through the correlation and
coskewness parameters; the second examines evidence of the moment structural breaks
in the mean, variance and skewness parameters of each asset return; and the third
considers a joint test of all of the contagion and structural break parameters.
Evidence of Contagion The first panel of Table 4 shows that the probability of
contagion as reflected by an increase in the traditional correlation coeffi cient between
all combinations of the US and European returns is 100% in the Global Financial Crisis
compared to the Great Moderation. The correlation channel of contagion dominates
the coskewness channel as the coskewness change is not significant for almost all of the
countries in the sample. There is decisive support for coskewness contagion occurring
between the US and Greek returns, with the value of the log of the Bayes factor
ln (BFru) being −127.06. This result reveals the preferences of risk averse investors in
moving away from Greek to US assets when in the crisis regime. The asset returns of
the remaining European countries of France, Germany and Italy are relatively stable
across the regimes, indicating the relative severity of contagion in Greece compared to
the rest of Europe. The joint tests for contagion between the US and all European
markets through each of the correlation and the coskewness comoments are contained
in the last column of Table 5. The probability of contagion occurring jointly through
the correlation channel is 100%, while there is decisive evidence of contagion through
coskewness with a value of the log of the Bayes factor ln (BFru) of −39.68.
The bottom row of the first panel of the Table presents the results for the test
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Table 5:
Empirical results of the contagion and structural break tests for the equity returns of
selected markets in Europe and the US in the Global Financial Crisis.
Tests Method
(DR) France Germany Greece Italy US ∀i
Contagion tests (i 6= j)
Correlation p 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Coskewness BF 1.31 1.33 -127.06 0.73 -39.68
Corr. BF -105.86 -97.27 -166.87 -102.72 -56.17
&coskew.
Structural break tests (i)
Mean p 0.86 0.85 0.12 0.89 0.99 1.00
Variance p 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Skewness BF 0.09 0.33 0.31 -0.59 -34.92 -69.21
Mean,var. BF -2182.60 -1524.20 -2877.30 -1627.60 -188.30 -8279.30
&skew.
Joint contagion (i 6= j) and structural break tests (i)
All BF -231.99 -196.79 -456.55 -199.70 -8335.50
Notes: The sample period is January 4, 2005 to 27 November, 2014. Contagion is
measured with respect to the US. See Table 2 for a summary of the tests and Section 4
for details. The method of hypothesis evaluation (DR) for each test is indicated in
the table. p denotes that a decision is probability based. BF denotes that a decision
is based on the Bayes Factor using the model selection evidence categories in
Table 3. Evidence of contagion or a structural break is indicated by bold font
in the table.
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that contagion occurs jointly through both the correlation and coskewness parameters.
This is the case for all country pairs with decisive evidence of contagion through the
two channels, with the log of the Bayes factor ln (BFru) ranging between −166.87 for
the Greece-US pair to −97.27 for the Germany-US pair. When considering the joint
test for ∀i, the value of the natural logarithm of the Bayes factors ln (BFru) is −56.17
showing decisive evidence of joint correlation and coskewness based contagion.
Evidence of Structural Breaks The result that stands out for the structural break
tests shown in the first panel of Table 5 is that there is evidence for a structural break
in all of the moments of the mean, variance and skewness for the US in the Global
Financial crisis period. The US is the only country in the sample with decisive evidence
of a structural break in the skewness parameter with the value of natural log of the
Bayes factor ln (BFru) of −34.92. As shown in Table 4 containing the posterior means
of the parameters, the skewness parameter in the US becomes more negative in the
Global Financial Crisis, changing from −0.072 to −1.018. The tests indicate a flight
to safety of risk averse investors that is independent of the comoments of the asset
returns of Europe with the US. Investors display relatively more risk appetite for US
assets during the Global Financial Crisis period.
The probabilities of a structural break in the mean for France, Germany and Italy
are 86, 85 and 89% respectively, while for Greece the probability of a change in the
mean is only 12%. Further, there is no evidence of a structural break in skewness for
the European countries considered individually. Although France, Germany, Greece
and Italy are not affected by a structural break in the first or third moments, they are
affected by structural breaks in the second order moment. The European markets are
individually affected by a break in the variance with probabilities for all markets of
100%.
Considering all m markets jointly, there is evidence for a structural break in the
mean in the Global Financial Crisis regime compared to the Great Moderation with
a probability of 100%. The higher order moment breaks are also evident jointly. The
probability of the joint structural break in the variance is 100%, and there is decisive
evidence of a structural break in skewness with the value of natural log of the Bayes
factor ln (BFru) of −69.21. The joint test of the mean, variance and skewness structural
breaks for each country and for the countries considered jointly show decisive evidence
of structural breaks. Overall, the results for the moment break tests show that it is
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the structural break in the variance which is most important for all markets, followed
equally by the mean and skewness break just for the US. However, when considered
jointly all moment break tests are significant.
Evidence of Joint Contagion and Structural Breaks The third panel of Table
5 provides evidence on the significance of the operation of contagion and structural
breaks simultaneously for each market i as well as for all of the markets jointly. The
bottom row, and particularly the last column of the bottom row can be thought of as
a test of all channels of comoment and moment change and can be thought of as an
overall test for a crisis and contagion. For the individual markets the evidence of joint
contagion and structural breaks is decisive in all cases with the value of the natural
logarithm of the Bayes factor ranging between −456.55 for Greece, to −196.79 for
Germany. For the combined markets ln (BFru) is −8335.50 indicating the importance
of examining contagion and structural breaks jointly.
5.4 Sensitivity to Priors
The priors of the dates of when the Great Moderation ends and when the Global
Financial Crisis begins are chosen to be strong given the dramatic nature of the events
in financial markets first originating in the US. This section examines the sensitivity
of the model by reducing the priors of being in the Great Moderation and Global
Financial Crisis regimes respectively. If the priors are set up as Pr (st = 0) = 0.80
before July 25, 2007 rather than Pr (st = 0) = 0.99 and if Pr (st = 1) = 0.80 rather
than Pr (st = 1) = 0.99 for the period March 3, 2008 to November 27, 2014, then there
is more volatility in the probability of being in a particular regime as shown in Figure
5. The results of reestimating the contagion and structural break tests in the RSSN
model with the relaxed priors are contained in Table 6. Comparison of Table 6 with
the original results in Table 5 shows that the tests for contagion and structural breaks
are almost qualitatively the same, with the differences being that the structural break
in the mean is no longer significant for the US or for ∀i markets.
5.5 Comparison to the Asian Financial Crisis
Most financial market crises of the past three decades are of short duration, sometimes
only being days or weeks (see Fry-McKibbin et al., 2014 for a comparison of crisis
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Figure 5: Probability of being in the Global Financial Crisis regime with relaxed priors.
Notes: The sample period is January 4, 2005 to November 28, 2014.
Table 6:
Empirical results of the contagion and structural break tests for the equity returns of
selected markets in Europe and the US in the Global Financial Crisis with relaxed
priors outlined in Section 5.4.
Tests Method
(DR) France Germany Greece Italy US ∀i
Contagion tests (i 6= j)
Correlation p 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Coskewness BF 0.68 0.46 -7.60 0.33 -38.03
Corr. BF -79.11 -76.55 -55.07 -75.29 -41.22
&coskew.
Structural break tests (i)
Mean p 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.71 0.34
Variance p 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Skewness BF 0.22 0.03 0.47 -0.73 -3.10 -14.76
Mean,var. BF -1337.60 -786.30 -3196.00 -746.70 -187.20 -6077.80
&skew.
Joint contagion (i 6= j) and structural break tests (i)
All BF -159.41 -136.22 -250.27 -128.50 -6119.00
Notes: The sample period is January 4, 2005 to 27 November, 2014. Contagion is
measured with respect to the US. See Table 2 for a summary of the tests and Section 4
for details. The method of hypothesis evaluation (DR) for each test is indicated in
the table. p denotes that a decision is probability based. BF denotes that a decision
is based on the Bayes Factor using the model selection evidence categories in
Table 2. Evidence of contagion or a structural break is indicated by bold font
in the table.
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Crisis which is the second longest in duration after the Global Financial Crisis. Most
authors define the Asian Financial Crisis period of at least six months and up to a year
making it a relevant comparator.
The model described in equations (7) to (9) is applied to the Asian equity markets
of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand around the time of the speculative
attack on Hong Kong currency and equity markets. The sample period extends from
January 11, 1995 to December 31, 1998. The prior for the crisis regime is set to
Pr (st = 1) = 0.99 during the period between October 20, 1997 and December 31,
1998. October 20 is the date of the speculative attack.12 The prior of the non-crisis
regime Pr(st = 0) = 0.99 from January 11, 1995 to December 31, 1996. The probability
of being in regime st = 0 decreases linearly from 0.99 on January 1, 1997 to 0.01 on
October 19, 1997.
Figure 6 presents the probability of the Asian equity markets being in a non-crisis
regime or the Asian Financial Crisis regime while Table 7 presents the contagion and
structural break tests.13 Inspection of Figure 6 shows that the regime change is evident
by mid 1997 and is consistently in the crisis regime by the time of the speculative
attack. Like the case for the Great Moderation and the Global Financial Crisis period,
transitioning between the two regimes is by no means smooth, reflecting the uncertainty
in financial markets even before the speculative attack.
The results for the Asian Financial Crisis validate those for Europe and the US dur-
ing the Global Financial Crisis. The channels of contagion and structural breaks that
are significant during the Asian Financial Crisis are similar to those for the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis. Correlation based contagion is significant for all markets and dominates
coskewness based contagion which is only significant for Malaysia. Unlike other coun-
tries affected by the Asian Financial Crisis, Malaysia made abrupt changes to policies
affecting international investor by instituting capital controls as a way to contain the
crisis. The change in policies affecting investors is perhaps a reason for the significance
of coskewness for Malaysia with respect to Hong Kong. Japan has a similar role of
being the destination of a flight to safety of risk averse investors to that of the US in
the first application as shown by the significance of each moment of the mean, variance
and skewness. Changes in these parameters are significant with 99% and 100% proba-
12An alternative starting date would be July 2, 1997 corresponding to the devaluation of the Thai
baht, however the equity focus of this paper makes the Hong Kong speculative attack the relevant
date and is consistent with Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
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Figure 6: Probability of being in the Asian Financial Crisis Regime. Notes: The sample
period is September 12, 1995 to December 31, 1998.
bility respectively for the mean and the variance, while there is decisive evidence of a
structural break in skewness with a value of natural log of the Bayes factor ln (BFru) of
−29.51. As it is for the application to the Global Financial Crisis the structural break
in the variance is significant across the board, with less evidence for a structural break
in the mean with the exception of Korea in addition to Japan. The evidence again
suggests that it is important to account for joint contagion and structural breaks.
6 Conclusions
In crisis periods, policy makers and investors are challenged by the need to understand
how asset return comovements might change compared to normal times. Decisions
need to be made relating to portfolio allocation and shock mitigation in being domesti-
cally oriented, internationally oriented or both. This paper develops a regime switching
skew-normal (RSSN) model of crisis and contagion by building upon Hamilton (1989)
by relaxing the assumption of multivariate normality with a multivariate skew-normal
distribution in its place. Contagion is defined through changes in the comoments of cor-
relation and coskewness in the non-crisis regime compared to a crisis regime. Tests for
structural breaks in the moments of the mean, variance and skewness are also specified.
Including higher order moments and comoments better reflects the characteristics of
financial returns data observed in both crisis periods and normal times. The extensions
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Table 7:
Empirical results of the contagion and structural break tests for the equity returns of
selected Asian markets in the Asian Financial Crisis.
Tests Method
(DR) Japan Korea Malay. Thai. HK. ∀i
Contagion tests (i 6= j)
Correlation p 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.95 1.00
Coskewness BF 0.52 0.33 -1.22 -0.88 -345.90
Corr&coskew BF -0.84 -9.87 -0.48 -0.50 -369.84
Structural break tests (i)
Mean p 0.96 0.99 0.12 0.86 0.61 0.49
Variance p 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Skewness BF -29.51 -0.29 -0.26 -0.10 -0.09 -39.46
Mean,var, BF -49.77 -89.78 -434.25 -187.89 -54.39 -782.84
& skew.
Joint contagion (i 6= j) and structural break tests (i)
All BF -41.87 -72.33 -67.96 -40.67 -1147.70
Notes: The sample period is January 4, 2005 to 27 November, 2014. Contagion is
measured with respect to Hong Kong. See Table 2 for a summary of the tests and Section 4
for details. The method of hypothesis evaluation (DR) for each test is indicated in
the table. p denotes that a decision is probability based. BF denotes that a decision
is based on the Bayes Factor using the model selection evidence categories in
Table 3. Evidence of contagion or a structural break is indicated by bold font
in the table.
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of the model to include coskewness based contagion and structural breaks in skewness
are important as risk averse investors prefer positive coskewness and positive skewness,
making these moments relevant to the crisis regime. Compared to other frameworks of
contagion which are often conducted on a bivariate basis, evidence of joint contagion
or structural breaks across the m asset returns is also assessed.
The regime switching nature of the model allows the crisis timing to be endogenous
to the model, eliminating the problems inherent in the a priori specification of the
crisis period by researchers, and the distributional assumption allows the specification
of both linear and non-linear features of contagion and structural breaks. The model
is estimated and hypotheses evaluated using Bayesian model estimation techniques.
The model is applied to the regimes of the Great Moderation and the Global Financial
Crisis for the US and selected European equity returns, and is compared to the Asian
Financial Crisis which is of a long duration and the best comparator for the Global
Financial Crisis.
The empirical results for the model applied to European and US equity markets
from 2005-2014 as well as to the model applied to the Asian equity markets from 1995-
1998 have qualitatively similar results. First, the transition between the non-crisis
regime to the crisis regime is volatile for both applications. Equity markets show ev-
idence of a shift towards a crisis state before the key triggers of the collapse of Bear
Stearns in March 2008 and the speculative attack on the Hong Kong equity market in
October 1998. Second, contagion measured through the traditional correlation coeffi -
cient is significant in all cases, validating the use of the correlation coeffi cient as a first
measure of contagion. Third, coskewness contagion is significant for one country pair
in each case. These are the Greece-US pair for the Global Financial Crisis and the
Malaysia-Hong Kong pair for the Asian Financial Crisis. Greece and Malaysia have
in common that their policy responses changed the circumstances for international in-
vestors investing in the respective countries, Greece through their sovereign default,
and Malaysia through the imposition of capital controls. Fourth, inspection of the
moment statistics suggests a flight to safety to the major markets of the US during
the Global Financial Crisis, and to Japan during the Asian Financial Crisis. While all
markets were affected by a significant change in volatility in the crisis periods, only the
US and Japan also showed evidence of breaks in the mean and skewness moments. The
results indicate that risk averse investors had more risk appetite for US and Japanese
assets during the crisis regimes, compared to their counterparts in either Europe or
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Asia. The flight to safety is true even when the US is a source of crisis in the first
place. Finally, all channels of contagion and structural breaks are significant when con-
sidered jointly, reinforcing the need to consider contagion and structural breaks during
crises in a multivariate setting.
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A The Gibbs Sampler for the RSSN Model
The details of the MCMC algorithm are as follows. By assuming prior independence






































To calculate the posterior density, the complete-data likelihood function is combined
with the joint prior density via Bayes rule. It is given as





















×f (Z) f (s|Θ)π (Θ) ,
where y = (y′1, . . . , y
′
T )
′, Z = (Z ′1, . . . , Z
′
T )
′ and s = (s1, . . . , sT )
′. f (Z) and f (s|Θ) are
provided in equations (9) and (18), respectively. Posterior draws can be obtained using
the Gibbs sampler. Specifically, we sequentially draw from π (β0, β1|y, Z,Σ0,Σ1, s),
π (Z|y, β0, β1,Σ0,Σ1, s), π (Σ0,Σ1|y, Z, β0, β1, s) and π(s|y, β0, β1,Σ0,Σ1, Z).
In the first step, π (βl|y, Z,Σ, s) , l = 0, 1, is a normal density. To see this, write




























































, β̂l = Dβl
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which is the kernel of a q-variate normal density with mean vector β̂l and covariance




with q = m+ k.
Next, following a similar argument, π (Z|y,Θ, s) is a normal density. To see this,
using equations (15) and (9)
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Finally, the log conditional density π (Σl|y, Z, β0, β1, s) is derived and given by






















































which is the kernel of an inverse-Wishart distribution. In fact, (Σl|y, Z, β0, β1, s) ∼
IW (τΣl , SΣl), where
τΣl = τΣ +
T∑
t=1











B The Savage-Dickey Density Ratio
The Savage-Dickey density ratio of Dickey (1971) is a specific representation of the
Bayes factor for comparing nested models. Suppose θ = (ψ, δ) is the vector of model
parameters in the unrestricted model Mu. The likelihood and prior for this model are
denoted as f (y|ψ, δ,Mu) and π (ψ, δ|Mu). Suppose the restricted model Mr can be
characterized as ψ = ψ0, where ψ0 is a constant vector, while the parameter vector δ
is free to vary. The likelihood and prior for the restricted model are then denoted as
f (y|δ,Mr) and π (δ|Mr). Suppose the priors for the two models satisfy
π (δ|ψ = ψ0,Mu) = π (δ|Mr) . (41)
Under this condition, Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) show that the Bayes factor
comparing Mr to Mu has the form
BFru =
p (ψ = ψ0|y,Mu)
p (ψ = ψ0|Mu)
, (42)
where p (ψ = ψ0|y,Mu) and p (ψ = ψ0|Mu) are respectively the posterior and prior
densities for ψ under the unrestricted model evaluated at the point ψ0. Equation (42)
is referred to as the Savage-Dickey density ratio.
C A Gaussian Copula for Evaluating Probability
Densities
The approach of using a Gaussian copula for approximating a probability density func-
tion at a specified point as developed by Geweke (2010) follows. Consider the random
vector u with q components
u = (u1, . . . , uq) . (43)
Suppose u(1), . . . , u(B) are independent and identically distributed draws from the prob-
ability density function p(u). Then p(u0), the density function is evaluated at the point
u0, which can be approximated using the following steps:
• Step 1: Use a Gaussian kernel to compute the approximations





















for i = 1, . . . , q, where φ(·) and Φ(·) are respectively the probability density
function and cumulative distribution function of
the standard normal distribution. This approximation is computed at each draw,
i.e., ui = u
(b)
i , b = 1, . . . , B.






















where l = 1, . . . , L.











W (b) ≈ 0.











for i = 1, . . . , q.












D Effi ciency of the MCMC Algorithm
A common diagnostic of MCMC effi ciency is the ineffi ciency factor, defined as











whereXt is a sequence for dates t = 1, . . . , T and l represents the lags. L is chosen to be
large enough so that the autocorrelation tapers off. To interpret the ineffi ciency factor,
note that independent draws from the posterior would give the ineffi ciency factor of 1.
Ineffi ciency factors indicate how many extra draws need to be taken in order to give the
results equivalent to independent draws. For instance, if 50, 000 draws of a parameter
are taken and an ineffi ciency factor of 100 is found, then the draws are equivalent to
500 independent draws from the posterior. The ineffi ciency factors for the RSSN model
in this paper are contained in Table 8.
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Table 8:
Ineffi ciency factors of the parameters. The parameters are estimated based on the
RSSN model with two regimes denoted by st = 0 and st = 1.
Parameters µi Σij ωij
st = 0 st = 1 st = 0 st = 1 st = 0 st = 1
France 1.00 1.00 5.50 6.12 53.27 96.53
Germany 1.00 1.00 5.74 5.97 28.74 89.57
Greece 1.00 1.00 5.15 34.81 109.98 45.40
Italy 1.00 1.00 5.57 7.07 57.06 100.80
US 1.00 1.11 3.99 27.50 7.50 67.65
France-Germany - - 5.21 16.19 5.36 80.08
France-Greece - - 5.05 25.69 65.10 34.40
France-Italy - - 5.75 10.86 24.69 122.74
France-US - - 3.69 35.94 6.48 63.58
Germany-Greece - - 4.59 3.27 116.85 5.04
Germany-Italy - - 5.01 29.28 106.81 61.96
Germany-US - - 3.69 5.70 20.62 11.15
Greece-Italy - - 5.29 28.02 36.98 130.78
Greece-US - - 3.87 38.24 5.02 71.44
Italy-US - - 3.12 20.20 6.79 31.77
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